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IBEW v. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the
Duty of Fair Representation
By Joshua Robert Steinhauer*
The scope of the obligation a union owes to the members of a
collective bargaining unit under the judicially created doctrine of
the duty of fair representation1 has yet to be clearly articulated by
the United States Supreme Court. This has left the lower courts
and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)2 with-
out adequate guidance as to the proper standard of care in apply-
ing the doctrine. Confusion has arisen as the Board and the federal
courts have sought to apply the doctrine to the realities of labor-
management relations.
On May 29, 1979, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in IBEW v. Foust.s The Court had granted certi-
orari on the specific question of "what if any circumstances justify
* B.S., 1977, Cornell University, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions. Member, Third Year Class.
1. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), a case arising under the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976), the Supreme Court announced that a union
has a statutory duty to represent fairly all members of the employee bargaining unit. In
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the Court applied the doctrine of fair
representation to a case under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
169 (1976). The Court implied the duty from the statutory grant to the union in § 9(a) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), of exclusive power to represent all employees in the unit.
2. The Board first invoked the unfair labor practice section of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976), in a duty of fair representation case in
Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). See note 106 & accompanying text infra.
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), makes conduct that would
"restrain or coerce.., employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157" an
unfair labor practice. Section 7 of the LMRA, id. § 157, in general gives employees the right
to engage in concerted activity, that is, the right to create and join unions or to refrain from
such activity.
The Supreme Court has never specifically passed on the Board's jurisdiction in this
area, although in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-84 (1976), the Court assumed, without
deciding, that a breach of the duty of fair representation would constitute an unfair labor
practice. The cases that have come before the Court have arisen under either § 301 of the
LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), or the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
3. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
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assessing punitive damages against a union that breaches its duty
of fair representation. '4 The import of the decision, however, has
not been limited to this question of remedies. Instead, it has enliv-
ened the debate over the scope of the duty of fair representation,
for the opinion arguably implies that union negligence alone may
be sufficient to constitute a breach of the duty.5 This Note exam-
ines the underlying implications of a negligence standard in Foust
to determine (1) whether it is compatible with the doctrine of fair
representation as developed in the courts and by the NLRB, and
(2) whether negligence is a proper standard for defining a union's
duty of fair representation.
The Note concludes that the negligence language in Foust is
not necessarily inconsistent with prior interpretations of the stan-
dard of care and probably does not reflect the Court's rejection of
those interpretations. Rather, Foust may indicate that the Court is
leaning towards more definitively prescribing the standard of care
under the terminology enunciated in Vaca v. Sipes" by applying a
negligence standard only in specific instances of procedural mis-
conduct. 7 The Note further suggests that in such specific instances
4. Id. at 46.
5. Only the Sixth Circuit has held that negligence alone breaches the duty of fair rep-
resentation. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (1975). See text accompanying
notes 60-81 infra. The Ninth Circuit has suggested a standard of gross negligence. See
Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (1978). Although the Supreme Court
has never held that simple negligence constitutes a breach, commentators have suggested
that the Court's decision in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), indi-
cates a movement by the Court in this direction. See Adomeit, Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight: Another Step in the Seemingly Inexorable March Toward Converting Federal
Judges (and Juries) Into Labor Arbitrators of Last Resort, 9 CONN. L. Ray. 627 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Adomeit]; Dinges, Ruzicka v. General Motors: An Unlikely Hero of
the Trade Union Movement-The Individual Employee in a Section 301 Case Who Has
Been a Victim of Union Negligence, 24 WAYNE L. Rav. 1773 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Dinges]; Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 160, Aug. 16, 1979, at A-1. See generally Clark, The
Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 Tax. L. Rv. 1119, 1121 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Clark]. See also Memorandum 79-55 of then NLRB General Counsel
John Irving to Regional Directors, Officers in Charge, & Resident Officers (July 9, 1979),
reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 137, July 16, 1979, at D-1 [hereinafter cited as
Irving]. The memorandum is based on an address by General Counsel John Irving to the
American Bar Association National Institute (Apr. 27, 1979), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), No. 137, July 16, 1979 at D-3 [hereinafter cited as Irving Address].
6. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
7. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975). The circuit
courts and the NLRB have already been subjecting different situations to varying levels of
scrutiny when applying the Vaca standard. See notes 105-48 & accompanying text infra.
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of procedural misconduct s a limited and specifically prescribed
negligence standard will best provide the uniformity and definition
essential to promote the important interests involved.9
The Prevailing Standard: Arbitrary,
Discriminatory, or Bad Faith Conduct
The prevailing standard in duty of fair representation cases
originally was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the 1967 deci-
sion in Vaca v. Sipes,1" which held that a union breaches its duty
only if its conduct is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."',
Thus, where a union arbitrarily ignores a grievance or processes it
in a perfunctory fashion, the union will be found to have breached
its duty of fair representation.
12
In formulating this standard, the Vaca Court grounded its rea-
8. See notes 55-81, 136-48 & accompanying text infra.
9. A negligence standard must be narrowly and specifically prescribed if the union is
to maintain its essential authority as the exclusive bargaining agent. To distinguish the lim-
ited line of cases where the union is negligent on procedural matters from those where its
error occurs in the context of substantive decisionmaking would provide additional protec-
tion for an individual's right to have his or her grievance heard while not undermining the
collective position of the union.
10. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
11. Id. at 190. The Court in Vaca found that the union had not breached its duty of
fair representation in refusing to pursue to arbitration a discharged union member's griev-
ance. The union had decided, on the merits, not to press the grievance after reviewing the
medical report of an independent doctor.
12. Id. at 191. In reaching its decision in Vaca, the Supreme Court relied on prior
decisions. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the Court deferred to the
broad discretion that the union possesses in negotiating the collective agreement, stating
that a union must be afforded a "wide range of reasonableness" in serving its constituents.
Id. at 338. In Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), the Court was called upon to evalu-
ate whether the union had breached its duty in presenting the employee's seniority griev-
ance at each step in the grievance procedure and in arbitration. The Court suggested that
preventing a union from exercising its discretion would weaken it in collective bargaining
negotiations and grievance proceedings. However, the Court noted that deference to union
authority at each stage of the collective bargaining process is not without its limits. Id. at
342. "[T]he controlling statutes have long been interpreted as imposing upon the bargaining
agent a responsibility equal in scope to its authority. . . ." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38
(1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). Although most courts view
Vaca as a "calculated broadening" of the fair representation standard, see, e.g., Griffin v.
International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), and the "arbitrariness" standard
remains a legal term of art that has never been precisely defined, see, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 210 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Clark, supra note 5, at 1121, the Supreme Court
and most lower courts have yet to hold that negligent conduct would be sufficient to estab-
lish a breach of the duty.
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soning on the manner in which federal labor law reconciles the in-
terests of the individual with the collective interests of the union:
"[T]he collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress and
administered by the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests
of an individual employee to the collective interests of all employ-
ees in a bargaining unit."1 s The Court endorsed the position of
Professor Archibald Cox14 who urges that unions be given broad
discretion in handling grievances as they are in the best position to
develop uniform solutions for existing problems and to anticipate
future problems.1 5 Although vesting such authority in the union
poses great risks for the individual whose access to contractual
remedies is often controlled by the union and the employer, Pro-
fessor Cox contends that the collective benefit that can be gained
by allowing the union broad discretion in the performance of its
duties as exclusive bargaining agent outweighs the danger of possi-
ble abuses of power by the union."" In favoring the Cox approach
in Vaca, the Supreme Court relied on the duty of fair representa-
tion to check such abuses.
17
Since announcing its decision in Vaca, the Supreme Court has
twice had the occasion to reexamine the scope of the duty of fair
representation. Although resting its decision on the narrow issue of
NLRB preemption, in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge s the
13. 386 U.S. at 182.
14. Id. at 191.
15. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 601 (1956) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Cox].
16. Id.
17. 386 U.S. at 191. See Swedo, Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.: Negligence, Ex-
haustion of Remedies, and Relief In Duty of Fair Representation Cases, 33 ARB. J. 6, 7
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Swedo]. In deciding Vaca, the Supreme Court rejected the ap-
proach of Professor Clyde Summers. 386 U.S. at 191. Professor Summers, the chief propo-
nent of the individual rights theory, premises his views on a policy of protecting the rights
of the individual in the grievance process. He argues that employees should be alfowed to
compel arbitration of their grievances. To filter out frivolous claims, he suggests that the
grievant be required to bear the expense of arbitration when his or her case has no prece-
dential value to the group. In circumstances in which the grievant prevails in a claim affect-
ing the group interest, however, Professor Summers reasons that the grievant should be
reimbursed by the union for effectively performing its function. Summers, Individual Rights
in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962). The Supreme
Court also has rejected the compromise position of Professor Blumrosen. He advocates giv-
ing an employee the absolute right to press his or her grievance to arbitration only if it
involves a "critical job interest" such as a discharge. Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Criti-
cal Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13
RUTGERS L. REv. 631 (1959). See also Milstead v. Local 957, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978).
18. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
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Court spoke of the necessity of showing "fraud, deceitful action or
dishonest conduct"19 to establish a breach of the duty. The Court
also stated that there must be evidence of "discrimination that is
intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.
'20
During the period of uncertainty that followed the Lockridge deci-
sion, some courts inferred that bad faith was an essential element
of the claim.2 1 This narrower standard has since been rejected, and
the dictum in Lockridge generally is viewed as a description of ex-
isting standards, rather than as a narrowing of Vaca.22
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,23 the Court quoted
with approval its prior discussion in Vaca.24 Hines nonetheless
seems to indicate a liberalizing of the Vaca standard.25 Although
apparently willing to allow "mere errors of judgment," 2 the Court
emphasized that it would not permit a union to leave discharged
employees without jobs and without a fair opportunity to secure an
adequate remedy.
2 7
Although the Hines decision generally is viewed as an affirma-
tion of the Vaca standard, some commentators have suggested that
the decision holds the union to a standard of "carelessness"28 and
19. Id. at 299 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)).
20. 403 U.S. at 301.
21. E.g., Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975).
22. Most courts today recognize that bad faith is not required to be proved by a plain-
tiff alleging breach of a duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB,
529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 316 (6th Cir.
1975) (McCree, J., concurring). See notes 39-40 & accompanying text infra.
23. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
24. See notes 10-12 & accompanying text supra.
25. Hines is especially significant because it dealt with the fixality of an arbitration
award where the union had improperly represented a discharged employee during his arbi-
tration hearing and only minimally investigated the grievance. Information discovered after
the hearing revealed that the charges against the grievant had been erroneous. The Court
vacated the arbitration award and found that the union had breached its duty. The Hines
decision, involving a postarbitration suit, seems to put the courts in a position of second
guessing the union and breaching the finality of arbitration. See generally United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960). More particularly, Hines can be criticized for putting the judiciary in
the position of evaluating the manner in which a union conducts its preparation for and
presentation of arbitration hearings. See, e.g., Adomeit, supra note 5, at 650-51; Waldman,
The Duty of Fair Representation in Arbitration, 29th Annual N.Y.U. Conf. on Labor 279,
287-88 (1976).
26. 424 U.S. at 571. The Court stated that "[t]he grievance processes cannot be ex-
pected to be error-free." Id.
27. Id. See notes 115-16 & accompanying text infra.
28. Adomeit, supra note 5.
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intimates that the Court may eventually settle upon negligence as
the appropriate standard of care. 9
In the final analysis, the vague contours of the Vaca standard
have allowed lower courts to approach claims of unfair representa-
tion on a case by case basis, balancing the equities presented on
the factual record, and then applying the general terminology nec-
essary to reach a legally supportable result.30 This practice de-
prives practitioners of needed predictability and thwarts the devel-
opment of a uniform labor policy in this area of the law.
Foust and Ruzicka: Inroads Towards a Negligence
Standard
IBEW v. Foust
IBEW v. Foust," is the Supreme Court's most recent decision
concerning the duty of fair representation. 2 Leroy Foust was an
employee of the Union Pacific Railway Company and a member of
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). In
March, 1970, he was injured on the job and placed on a medical
leave of absence. In February, 1971, he was discharged for not
properly requesting an extention of his leave as required under the
collective bargaining agreement.s Under the contract the union
29. Id.
30. Dinges, supra note 5, at 1782-83. See also Fanning, The Duty of Fair Representa-
tion, 19 B.C.L. REv. 813, 819 n.54 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fanning]. In Miranda Fuel
Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), the NLRB concluded that § 8(b)(1)(A) and § 8(b)(2) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1)(A)-(B) (1976), prohibited a union from taking action
against an employee for reasons that were "irrelevant, invidious, or unfair." 140 N.L.R.B. at
185. This phrase is vague and imprecise, and like the "arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad
faith" standard set forth in Vaca, contributed to the general ambiguity of the scope of the
doctrine. See Irving, supra note 5, at D-1; Address by John Truesdale, Federal Bar Associa-
tion 1979 Southwest Regional Conference (Mar. 1, 1979) & Labor Law Seminar of Nova
University (Mar. 3, 1979), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 50, Mar. 13, 1979, at F-
1. The uncertainty over the parameters of the duty is as grave before the Board as it is in
the courts. Moreover, this dichotomy does not appear to be diminishing.
31. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
32. Although Foust arose under the Railway Labor Act rather than the NLRA, cases
under the two acts have received similar treatment. See note I supra. There is every reason
to presume, therefore, that the decision in Foust will be extended to NLRA cases. This Note
treats cases under the two acts without distinction.
33. Under the collective bargaining agreement, employees were required either to re-
quest an extension before their leave expired or to return to work as scheduled. Foust
sought to renew his leave in late December, 1970, but correspondence between his attorney
(whom he had hired to handle the legal aspects of all of his accident related affairs, includ-
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had sixty days to file a grievance challenging the dismissal; Foust's
attorney had requested the union to take such action fifty-two
days after the discharge. The union, however, failed to meet the
deadline because of unnecessary and time-consuming correspon-
dence between union officials3' and, not surprisingly, Union Pacific
and the National Railroad Adjustment Board denied Foust's griev-
ance as untimely.
In the subsequent suit against the union for breach of its duty
of fair representation, the trial court instructed the jury that "the
essential legal standard which the evidence had to satisfy was arbi-
trariness and capriciousness of the Union; [and] that a union may
not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a per-
functory manner."35 The district court upheld the jury's award of
$40,000 actual damages and $75,000 punitive damages.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in
most respects 6 and found that "[i]n giving its charge the trial
court adhered to the decision and language of Vaca."87 Further-
more, it found this to be the "correct selection of [the] standards
and a proper statement of the applicable law."38 The union had
pressed the circuit court to apply the narrower bad faith standard
ing medical treatment, hospitalization, and surgery) and Union Pacific revealed that the
company had not received a doctor's statement supporting his request. Notwithstanding
Union Pacific's assurance on January 25, 1971, that it would await arrival of the statement
before reviewing his request, Foust was discharged on February 3, 1971. Foust's attorney
failed to persuade Union Pacific to reconsider and, thereafter, he requested the IBEW dis-
trict chairman to initiate grievance proceedings on his client's behalf. See 442 U.S. at 43-44.
34. Although he knew that the 60-day deadline was imminent, IBEW District Chair-
man Jones did not prepare a grievance letter. Instead, he contacted IBEW General Chair-
man Wisniski in Omaha, Nebraska. Wisniski insisted Foust himself request the union's as-
sistance in writing and drafted a letter stating that the union could not "handle" the claim
until it received such authorization. Wisniski neither phoned Foust nor mailed the letter to
him, but mailed it to Jones who signed the letter and forwarded it to Foust, 61 days after
the discharge. Jones filed the grievance before receiving the written authorization but two
days after the time had expired. The claim form had been prepared by Wisniski in Omaha,
Nebraska, sent to Jones in Rawlins, Wyoming, and then mailed to the railroad back in
Omaha. Id. at 44.
35. Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710, 714 (1978), aff'd, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). "[The terms]
arbitrary and capricious were said to be synonymous and were defined as an act done with-
out adequate principle or an act not done according to reason and judgment. Arbitrary and
capricious were defined as requiring judgment on the basis of whether the act complained of
is reasonable or unreasonable under the circumstances." 572 F.2d at 710.
36. 572 F.2d at 719. The circuit court remanded the case for consideration of whether
the punitive damages award was excessive.
37. Id. at 715.
38. Id.
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appearing in dictum in Lockridge,39 but the court, citing Hines,40
properly rejected the union's argument.
In upholding the district court in Foust, the Tenth Circuit
stated that "the perfunctory manner of handling the claim was suf-
ficient justification for the submission of the issue of breach of
duty to the jUry.41 The court found no excuse for the union's in-
sistence upon a personal authorization from the grievant before it
would proceed with the grievance or for the "needless correspon-
dence back and forth."42 The court also noted that the union's con-
duct in handling a previous grievance for Foust could serve to give
its subsequent failure to pursue the present claim an arbitrary and
unreasonable character.43
In its petition for certiorari, the union presented both the
standard of care-perfunctory processing issue and the punitive
damages issue, but the Supreme Court declined to review the lower
court's formulation of the standard of fair representation. 44 Ac-
cordingly, Justice Marshall, writing for a majority of five, directly
addressed only the damages question, adopting a per se rule deny-
ing punitive damages in unfair representation cases."
Because the question was not before the Court, there was no
holding on the fair representation issue. However, in a concurring
opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by the Chief Justice and Jus-
tices Rehnquist and Stevens, protested the majority's adoption of a
39. Id. See notes 18-22 & accompanying text supra.
40. 572 F.2d at 715. See notes 23-27 & accompanying text supra.
41. 572 F.2d at 716. For legal support, the court of appeals cited Hughes v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 683, 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977); Ruzicka v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181
(4th Cir. 1972); and De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281
(1st Cir. 1970). A review of the decisions reveals that the frequency of plaintiffs' recoveries
is greater in jury trials. Often, the most liberal opinions are those upholding jury verdicts.
This may help to explain, in part, the divergence between the courts and the narrower stan-
dard promoted by the NLRB.
42. 572 F.2d at 715. See note 33 supra.
43. 572 F.2d at 716. Foust had made an earlier effort to file a claim for wages while he
was attending physical therapy sessions. The union apparently believed that this claim was
cognizable under the Federal Employees' Liability Act but made little effort to clarify the
matter. But see Hughes v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 683, 554 F.2d 365, 367 n.1
(9th Cir. 1977).
44. 439 U.S. 892 (1978).
45. 442 U.S. at 52. "Because general labor policy disfavors punishment, and the ad-
verse consequences of punitive damages awards could be substantial, we hold that such
damages may not be assessed against a union that breaches its duty of fair representation
by failing properly to pursue a grievance." Id.
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per se rule. Justice Blackmun stated that adopting such a rule was
"manifestly unnecessary" 46 because the record provided a narrower
ground for decision in that
[t]he union's conduct here betrayed nothing more than negli-
gence, and thus presented an inappropriate occasion for awarding
punitive damages under any formula. In order to dispose of this
case, therefore, the Court need hold only that the trial judge
erred as a matter of law in submitting the punitive damages issue
to the jury .... 47
This statement raises a major issue as to the scope of the duty of
fair representation. For if, as suggested, the punitive damages
claim was struck down because the record indicated that the
union's conduct was only negligent, Justice Blackmun's statement
would nevertheless imply that at least the four concurring Justices
might allow the compensatory damages award to stand as a negli-
gent breach of the duty of fair representation.
Even though the Supreme Court and most lower courts have
yet to hold that negligence alone would suffice to establish a
breach of the duty,'5 the significance of Justice Blackmun's lan-
guage should not be overlooked. The tendency towards an increas-
ingly expansive interpretation of the standard of care in some cir-
cuits, and arguably by the Supreme Court itself,49 has been the
focus of much concern; 50 it is therefore reasonable to presume that
Justice Blackmun was cognizant of the import of the language he
used. The underlying implication in his remarks, that negligent
conduct may be sufficient to constitute a breach of the duty of fair
representation, was not elaborated on in Justice Blackmun's con-
curring opinion and the majority opinion neither refuted nor di-
rectly addressed the issue.51
Whether or not the Court intended to imply the possibility of
a negligence standard, this underlying implication has sparked a
46. Id. at 60 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 53.
48. See note 12 supra.
49. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See also notes 25-29
& accompanying text supra.
50. See Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M. 2663, 2665 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Irving,
supra note 5, at D-1, D-3.
51. Justice Marshall, for the Court, stated in response only that "[w]e are ... unwill-
ing to substitute our judgment for that of the jury, District Court, and Court of Appeals on
this essentially evidentiary question." 442 U.S. at 46 n.7. The jury had been instructed that
it could award punitive damges if it found the union had acted "maliciously, or wantonly, or
oppressively." Id.
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debate on the question,52 heightening the existing confusion over
the scope of the duty of fair representation. After Foust, there is
an even greater need for a clarification of the scope of the obliga-
tion and, specifically, an examination of whether negligence may
be an appropriate standard.
The mere fact that four Justices were willing to characterize
the union's conduct in Foust as negligent does not, of course, mean
that these Justices would abandon Vaca and its progeny in favor
of a broad negligence standard. Furthermore, it is not by any
means implicit from pre-Foust fair representation cases that the
Court would reexamine the fundamental basis of its view of the
relationship of the union and its members 3 by imposing on the
union the higher standard of care associated with a fiduciary rela-
tionship. 4 However, a negligence standard may be applied in cases
such as Foust without disturbing the policy underlying the Court's
decisions by applying a negligence standard only in prescribed in-
stances of procedural misconduct.
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.
The facts in Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.55 closely parallel
the facts in Foust, and an examination and comparison of the two
cases will illustrate the use of a negligence standard in a narrow set
of circumstances. Ruzicka, an active union member and employee
of nearly eleven years, was discharged on March 31, 1970, for being
intoxicated on the job and using threatening and abusive language
towards his supervisors. He filed a grievance claiming that the dis-
charge was an "unduly harsh" penalty. Having lost in the early
stages of the grievance procedure, the union filed a "notice of un-
52. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 160, Aug. 16, 1979, at 1, A-1 to -3.
53. See notes 13-16 & accompanying text supra.
54. In the past, the Court has analogized the relationship of the union and its mem-
bers to that of a legislature representing its constituents, rather than to the higher degree of
responsibility owed by an attorney to a client. "For the [bargaining] representative is
clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature." Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192, 198 (1944). A union, like a legislature, is selected by a majority of its constituents. In
addition, it acts as the representative of all, including those who opposed its election or
policies. Cf. Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of the
Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 901-02
(1975) (author argues the legislative analogy is a limited one). See also Summers, The Indi-
vidual Employee's Rights Under The Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Repre-
sentation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251, 276 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Summers].
55. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
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adjusted grievance." To invoke arbitration, however, the collective
agreement required the union to file a "statement of unadjusted
grievance" with the company simultaneous with the filing of the
"notice of unadjusted grievance".58 Local union officials discussed
the grievance amongst themselves and with management personnel
but "inexplicably neglected" to file the required statement despite
having twice sought and received extensions of the filing deadline.
Once time limits for filing the statement had passed, the company
disclaimed any further obligation under the agreement.57
The Sixth Circuit, in what has become a widely debated deci-
sion, determined that "[s]uch negligent handling of the grievance,
unrelated as it was to the merits of [the grievant's] case, amounts
to unfair representation."58 In an apparent effort to reach a result
consistent with Vaca, the court alternately describes the "negligent
failing to take a basic and required step," when no decision is
made on the merit of an individual's grievance, as "arbitrary and
perfunctory," "arbitrar[y]," or simply "perfunctory" handling."9 In
denying a petition for rehearing en banc, the same judges com-
mented that "[o]ur opinion in this action speaks to a narrow range
of cases in which unexplained union inaction, amounting to arbi-
trary treatment, has barred an employee from access to an estab-
lished union-management apparatus for resolving grievances."80
Although the Tenth Circuit did not analyze the facts in Foust
by applying a simple negligence standard, the record in the case is
easily susceptible to such an analysis. Comparing the records in
Foust and Ruzicka brings their similarities into sharper focus. In
both cases the underlying grievance was a claim of wrongful dis-
charge. Additionally, while the union's inaction in Ruzicka oc-
curred just prior to arbitration and the wrongful conduct in Foust
occurred at the preliminary filing stages of the grievance process,
both employees were effectively barred from adjudicating their
claims in the employer and union controlled grievance procedure.
56. Id. at 308.
57. Id. at 310.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 912, 913 (6th Cir. 1975) (denying a
petition for rehearing en bane). If a union has an affirmative obligation to investigate the
merit of an employee's grievance as it did in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 194 (1967), see
notes 136-42 & accompanying text infra, then the union's inaction in Ruzicka may legiti-
mately be seen as a breach of the duty under Vaca. See 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 642, 653
(1976). See also Swedo, supra note 17, at 10-11.
March 1981] FAIR REPRESENTATION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In neither case was the union's failure to proceed based on any
consideration of the merits of the grievance."1 The union's error in
both cases was its inexplicable failure to perform a basic ministe-
rial function-filing a grievance within contractually specified time
limits. 6 2
Although the Ruzicka court described the union's conduct as
negligent,63 it deliberately and repeatedly connected its characteri-
zation of negligence with "arbitrary" and "perfunctory" conduct."
The court, however, did not make clear the relationship between
negligence and arbitrary or perfunctory conduct.6 " It thus is un-
clear whether Ruzicka broadens the Vaca standard or merely clari-
fies it.
The terms "arbitrary" and "perfunctory" have never been de-
fined with such precision that they provide a practical guide to the
duty of fair representation." In fact, they often appear to be as
amorphous and elastic as the court or jury deems the equities of
the case to require.67 This imprecise standard provides little uni-
formity and guidance to the union and risks undue court interfer-
ence in the grievance process.
Courts generally have not held that a union's conduct need be
intentional to be "arbitrary." ' Decisions typically define "arbi-
trary" conduct as lacking in a rational basis, 69 "willful and unrea-
soning, '70 or "without adequate determining principle. 7 1 At least
61. See note 136 infra.
62. In Ruzicka the error was termed "unexplained union inaction," 528 F.2d at 913; in
Foust the error was deemed inexcusable, 572 F.2d at 715.
63. 523 F.2d at 310. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
64. 523 F.2d at 310. See notes 59-60 & accompanying text supra. The court further
emphasized this point by stating that the union's conduct "amount[ed] to arbitrary treat-
ment." 528 F.2d at 913.
65. See Swedo, supra note 17, at 9; 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 642, 649 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 210 (1976) (Black, J., dissenting); Griffin v.
International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1972).
67. See generally Clark, supra note 5, at 1170. "By elaborating on the 'perfunctory'
standard in Vaca, courts can go as far as necessary to assure that unions represent individu-
als fairly." Id. See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
68. See Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 1978);
cf. De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir. 1970)
(holding the inexplicable failure of a union to investigate a series of grievances was arbi-
trary). But see Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 1975) (McCree,
J., concurring).
69. See Robertson v. Cameron, 224 F. Supp. 60, 62 (D.D.C. 1963).
70. In re West Laramie, 457 P.2d 498, 502 (Wyo. 1969).
71. Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines "arbitrary" to mean: "[w]ithout adequate de-
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two of these definitions of arbitrary conduct could include negli-
gent action or inaction. The same holds true for "perfunctory con-
duct." The Random House Dictionary, for instance, defines per-
functory as that "performed merely as an uninteresting or routine
duty; hasty and superficial;... negligent." 
72
Two examples illustrate the difficulties in applying the terms
"arbitrary" and "perfunctory" to union conduct. In Griffin v. In-
ternational Union, UAW, 3 the Fourth Circuit determined that
the union had handled the employee's discharge grievance in a per-
functory manner because it filed the employee's claim with the
management official with whom the employee had fought when the
union could have filed with someone else. Needless to say, the
grievance was denied. Although the court noted that negligent con-
duct was not a breach of the duty,74 the record actually indicates
the negligent handling of a procedural matter.
Similarly, in De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Pack-
inghouse,75 a union was held liable for the "perfunctory" process-
ing of a grievance when the facts could have supported a finding
based on negligence. In De Arroyo, the union failed to investigate
or make any decision on the merits of six discharged employees'
grievances because of a good faith but "inexplicable" belief that a
pending NLRB proceeding would apply to their situations."6 In
these two cases, as in Ruzicka and Foust, the error was procedu-
ral-failure to give adequate attention to the grievance-and not
based on a faulty decision on the substantive merits."
termining principles;. . . not done or acting according to reason or judgment;. . . not gov-
erned by any fixed rules or standard." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979). "[A]
decision to be nonarbitrary must be (1) based upon relevant, permissible union factors
which excludes [sic] the possibility of it being based upon motivations such as personal
animosity or political favoritism; (2) a rational result of the consideration of those factors;
and (3) inclusive of a fair and impartial consideration of the interests of all employees."
Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted).
72. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1070 (unabr. ed. 1973)
(emphasis added). In Ethier v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1979), the
court defined "perfunctory" as "unconcerned, unsolicitous or indifferent." Id. at 736.
73. 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972).
74. Id. at 183.
75. 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970).
76. Id. at 284. The NLRB action concerned the company's attempt to subcontract
work, while the discharges at issue resulted from automation. The distinction should have
been apparent because the union had recently processed another employee's grievance aris-
ing from dismissal because of automation. Id. at 285.
77. The Ruzicka court pointed out that De Arroyo presented a "parallel" situation to
the case before it, 523 F.2d at 310 n.1, although it did not attempt to analyze the First
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Accepting that unfair representation is not limited to inten-
tional conduct, 8 a negligence standard may be useful in providing
greater definition to the vagaries of the Vaca standard. However,
its application must be specifically and narrowly confined.7 9 The
Circuit's opinion as a decision based on negligence. Both Griffin and De Arroyo were cited
by the circuit courts in Ruzicka and Foust.
78. See Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir.
1978); cf. De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970)
(unintentional acts may be arbitrary if they reflect reckless disregard for employee rights).
79. The district courts in the Sixth Circuit generally have limited Ruzicka's applica-
tion to cases of procedural negligence and interpreted the case as a narrow holding provid-
ing greater definition to the word "arbitrary" and "perfunctory."
In Perry v. Chrysler Corp., 101 L.R.R.M. 2681 (E.D. Mich. 1978), the court found that
the union did not breach its duty when it rejected, without consulting the grievant, manage-
ment's settlement offer to reinstate an employee. The grievant admittedly was seeking treat-
ment for a drinking problem, and the settlement offer was contingent upon his participation
in an alcohol abuse rehabilitation program. The court distinguished Ruzicka, noting that
the negligence standard applies only with respect to purely ministerial functions. Id. at
2685. In Perry, however, the court reasoned that the union had made a determination of the
merits of the grievance and exercised its discretion in rejecting a settlement offer it consid-
ered not to be in the best interests of the membership. Id. at 2684.
In Kleban v. Hygrade Food Prod. Corp., 102 L.R.R.M. 2773 (E.D. Mich. 1979), the
district court interpreted Ruzicka as fitting into a somewhat broader class of cases. Union
negligence was said to amount to arbitrary treatment when it prevents the grievance and
collective bargaining systems from working and thereby deprives an employee of his or her
right to be represented. See id. at 2778. While the district court's view in Kleban is broader
than that suggested in Perry, its interpretation does place Ruzicka within the standard of
Vaca and attempts to place some limits on the Sixth Circuit's 1978 decision in Milstead v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 957, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978). In Milstead, the
union's ignorance of the applicable contract provisions in preparation for and presentation
of a grievance hearing amounted to a total failure of the grievance process for the dis-
charged employee.
In Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976), the court focused
on both the ministerial duties of the union and the deprivation of employee rights. The
employee in Ruggirello relied on the union when it told him that his discharge grievance
was meritorious and that it would pursue it. The union, however, failed to file the grievance
formally. The court cited Ruzicka and found the union's negligent conduct amounted to
arbitrariness: "If a union breaches its duty of fair representation in failing to process a
grievance before determining its merit, it is certainly liable for failing to initiate a grievance
after acknowledging its merit." Id. at 760 (emphasis added). This possible extension of Ru-
zicka has not been followed by other courts.
The notion that ordinary negligence could be a breach of the duty of fair representation
was specifically rejected in Savel v. Detroit News, 435 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Mich. 1977). There
the court distinguished the case before it from Ruzicka, emphasizing that in Ruzicka the
union had made no determination of the merit of the employee's grievance. The district
court found Ruzicka to be within the "substance" of the Vaca standard of arbitrariness and
perfunctoriness. The union's conduct in Ruzicka was interpreted by the court in Savel as
"something more than ordinary negligence and.., more akin to gross negligence." Id. at
334. Accord, Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M 2663 (W.D. Mich. 1978). Gross negligence
amounts to arbitrariness when it forecloses the employee's grievance from further considera-
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courts should not be in a position of second-guessing union deci-
sionmaking, for this would be contrary to established federal labor
policy favoring the collective authority of the union.0 The "negli-
gence" referred to in Ruzicka and Foust thus should be seen as a
limited clarification of the Vaca standard"' and accordingly should
be applied in a narrow context.
The Arguments Over a Negligence Standard in
Unfair Representation Cases
With the exception of the Sixth Circuit and possibly the Ninth
Circuit, 2 both the courts and the NLRB agree than an across-the-
board negligence standard is inappropriate in unfair representation
cases.8" It generally is recognized that a simple negligence stan-
tion. Id. Cf. Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 1978)
(unintentional acts may be arbitrary if they reflect reckless disregard for employee rights)
(citing Ruzicka in finding the union's act constituted gross negligence); Besedich v. Missile
& Space Div. of LTV Aerospace Corp., 433 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (citing Ruzicka
in finding the union was not guilty of gross negligence).
80. See notes 12-25 & accompanying text supra.
81. See Swedo, supra note 17, at 9-11. Judge McCree's suggestion, contained in his
concurrence in Ruzicka, of a limited negligence standard independent of the Vaca terminol-
ogy, 523 F.2d at 315-16 (McCree, J., concurring), has found little support as the courts con-
tinue to adhere to Vaca's catchwords. For analytical clarity, however, Judge McCree's pre-
mise is appealing. He stated that the terms "arbitrary" and "perfunctory" reflect only
intentional conduct; therefore, situations of unintentional conduct could be analyzed by us-
ing a limited negligence standard. Judge McCree parted company with the majority's at-
tempts to link negligence with Vaca's terminology. He argued that "[a]rbitrary and per-
functory are adjectives characterizing intentional conduct that is capricious or superficial."
Id. at 315. Judge McCree described negligent conduct as unintentional. He found that negli-
gence could itself be a breach of the duty of fair representation in situations like Ruzicka.
For example, Judge McCree suggests that a negligent failure to meet procedural filing re-
quirements absent "a good faith judgment for a lawful reason that it should not file" would
render a union liable for breach of its duty. 523 F.2d at 316. A union's decision on whether
to pursue a particular course of action may be based on any lawful reason including
financial considerations, interests of the majority and similar factors. See note 79 & accom-
panying text supra; notes 82-85 & accompanying text infra. Despite the analytical appeal of
Judge McCree's dichotomy, neither case law nor common definitions require such a firm
distinction. This is especially true with respect to the standard of "perfunctoriness." See
notes 72-77 & accompanying text supra.
82. In Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978), the
court arguably applied a standard of gross negligence.
83. See, e.g., Franklin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979) (neg-
ligence in failing to present certain medical records to arbitration board not a breach); Co
v. United Rubber Workers, 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978) (negligence in misnumbering em-
ployee's claim not a breach); Dente v. International Organization of Masters, Local 90, 492
F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974) (negligent delay in filing a griev-
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dard, although appealing in its deference to the legitimate interests
of the wronged individual, would weaken the union's authority and
thereby insert an element of intolerable uncertainty into intra-
union and labor-management relations.8 4 Nonetheless, the diffi-
culty of meeting the burden of proof imposed by Vaca and the
relative paucity of actual recoveries under the Vaca standard have
motivated some commentators to argue in favor of adopting negli-
gence as the appropriate standard of care.8 5
Advocates of a negligence standard point out that under the
doctrine of the finality of the grievance arbitration procedure, neg-
ligent representation or handling may be as detrimental to the em-
ployee as intentional or discriminatory conduct.86 They argue that
the union's voluntarily assuming and often intentionally seeking
the authority to act as the employees' exclusive representative has
placed it in the position of a fiduciary representing the employees;
the union, therefore, owes an affirmative duty to exercise reasona-
ble care in protecting individual interests.8 7 Although the notion of
a fiduciary relationship is not novel, 8 the commentators argue that
the Vaca standard has not been applied so as to give actual effect
to the concept. 89 They criticize the analogy made between the rela-
tionship of the union and its members and that of the legislature
and its constituents,90 and argue that the union should be held re-
sponsible for exercising reasonable care-the standard of care that
ance cost grievant backpay award, not a breach); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d
868 (3d Cir. 1970); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35, 239 N.L.R.B. 1321
(1979); Irving, supra note 5, at D-2.
84. See notes 101-02 & accompanying text infra. In a suit under § 301 of the LMRA,
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), an employee must prove a breach of the duty of fair representation
by the union before he or she can recover from the employer. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
186 (1967).
85. See Dinges, supra note 5, at 1778 n.16; Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for
Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U. TOL. L.
REv. 514, 515 n.5 (1974). Professors Flynn and Higgins argue that "unless the courts change
their judicially created standard and allow a recovery for ordinary negligence, employees
will always be second class citizens in their industrial world." Flynn & Higgins, Fair Repre-
.sentation: A Survey Of The Contemporary Framework And A Proposed Change In The
Duty Owed To The Employee, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. Rav. 1096, 1144 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Flynn & Higgins].
86. Flynn & Higgins, supra note 85. See also Summers, supra note 54, at 276.
87. Flynn & Higgins, supra note 85, at 1148-52; Summers, supra note 54, at 276-78.
88. The fiduciary relationship concept was discussed in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
89. See, e.g., Flynn & Higgins, supra note 85, at 1148-52.
90. See note 54 supra.
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an attorney must exercise towards a client. 1 Furthermore, they
find it inconsistent with federal labor policy to allow the employer
the windfall of being insulated from liability because of the union's
negligence. This not only gives the company an unintended benefit
accruing from the union's exclusive bargaining status, but leaves
the employee, wronged by both the employer and the union, with-
out a remedy.92 "Whatever can be said for sacrificing the minor-
ity's interests for the good of all, or at least for the majority, the
idea makes no sense when the issue is what should be done regard-
ing a single individual's grievance with his or her employer."93
These arguments fundamentally reject the policy enunciated
by Professor Cox and embraced by the Supreme Court in Vaca.
94
In its place these commentators urge that the "courts should be
clear in declaring that protection of employees damaged or dis-
charged in violation of the collective bargaining contract is a pri-
mary function of the union." 95 Although recognizing that a broad
reasonable care standard "places a substantial burden on the
union,"9 6 these commentators reason that the burden is justified
by recognizing the special character of the relationship between a
union and its members and by emphasizing the individual's con-
tractual rights.
The commentators who advocate a negligence standard fur-
ther maintain that when a union's negligence costs an employee
the opportunity to seek redress for his or her grievance, the union
"does not demonstrate its effectiveness to other workers. '9 7 In such
situations, predominantly discharge cases, "[t]he policy of main-
taining equality of bargaining power between the union and com-
pany, which is a stated objective of the National Labor Relations
Act, is undermined when employees lose respect for their union
and seek to vindicate their rights on their own." 9 Although this
91. See note 54 supra.
92. Dinges, supra note 5, at 1783-84; Summers, supra note 54, at 278. See note 84
supra.
93. Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individ-
ual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 903 (1975).
94. See notes 13-17 & accompanying text supra.
95. Flynn & Higgins, supra note 85, at 1150. See also Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclu-
sive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be
Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 903-04 (1975).
96. Summers, supra'note 54, at 277.
97. Dinges, supra note 5, at 1783.
98. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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argument has both a logical and moral appeal, it assumes that the
membership of a union will have a collective reaction to the mis-
handling of an individual's grievance. In reality, however, such a
response would only be likely to occur in situations of particularly
invidious actions-actions which would probably constitute a
breach of the duty even under a conservative application of Vaca.
These policy approaches, appealing in the abstract, ignore
some of the basic realities of labor relations practice, as well as
countervailing administrative, political, and economic considera-
tions. Administration and enforcement of the collective agreement
typically are conducted either by the local shop steward or busi-
ness agent. Quite often the job of shop steward is not full-time and
the holder of the position has received little, if any, formal train-
ing.9 To expect the grievance process to be error free or to subject
it to the kind of scrutiny to which a trained attorney is subject in
his or her preparation for and conduct of a trial is therefore un-
realistic'00 and inconsistent with the policies underlying the
NLRA. The purpose of the Act is primarily to facilitate collective
bargaining and thereby promote industrial peace.101 The decision
to protect the strength of the union in relation to the employer by
limiting the scope of the union's obligation and liability under the
doctrine of fair representation is designed to effectuate this policy
of the Act.
02
A union is by nature a political majoritarian organization. Al-
though undoubtedly the interest of an individual or a minority will
occasionally be sacrificed to that of the majority, the union official
needs to appear to be an effective advocate for all members of the
bargaining unit. This political pressure on union leadership should
help to ensure that an individual's minority interest is protected
99. Irving, supra note 5, at D-4. General Counsel Irving quotes President of the Ma-
chinists Union, Bill Winpisinger: "Most of the positions that have to be filled in a union
... are volunteer in nature. They are done out of a sense of duty. The people who serve in
these jobs are not professionals. They are plain everyday working people. For example, the
financial secretaries who are elected to handle local union funds are not accountants or
bookkeepers. Many do their union work over the kitchen table at night, after pulling a full
day's shift on the job. In most cases, locally elected officers do union jobs for little or no
reward." INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REPORT 9 (Fall 1978). See Denver Stereotypers
v. N.L.R.B., 104 L.R.R.M. 2656 (10th Cir. 1980); Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d
1123 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3246 (1980).
100. Walden v. Local 71, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 468 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.
1972).
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See also Dinges, supra note 5, at 1783.
102. See notes 13-17 & accompanying text supra.
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without imposing a broad negligence standard on the union. In
practice, members of the bargaining unit must be content with
seeking a change in union stewards or officers to express their dis-
satisfaction in the handling of their grievances or the union's over-
all performance. Although this may appear to be more a theoretical
explanation than an actual solution for the -aggrieved individual
whose complaint will not likely be directly rectified, dissatisfaction
should be neither the test nor the excuse for imposing union
liability.
A union's activity, especially at the local level, is also re-
stricted by economic considerations. For instance, the union must
always be conscious of maintaining sufficient financial reserves to
police the contract through the grievance procedure, to maintain
an adequate strike fund, and to prepare for other necessities. Be-
cause of these considerations, the interest of the majority must al-
ways be paramount in the union decisionmaker's mind. The vul-
nerability of the union treasury is a significant and legitimate
reason to limit the scope of a union's liability for breach of the
duty of fair representation.108
In the vast majority of cases, and as a general matter of labor
policy, it is undesirable to promote judicial interference with regu-
lation of union affairs. Labor unions have already become burden-
somely regulated and scrutinized in every facet of their operations
by government agencies and the courts. As a general rule, absent
evidence of improper considerations, the substantive decisions of
the union representatives should be deferred to in the handling of
grievances entrusted to their care without being second guessed by
a judge or jury. 04
Nevertheless a more stringent standard of care is not inappro-
priate in all circumstances. Compelling reasons may demand a
greater obligation in a very limited area-that of procedural
malfeasance.
103. The need to protect the financial viability of unions was emphasized in IBEW v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1979). See Irving, supra note 5, at D-1 n.4. But see Dinges, supra
note 5, at 1784-85 (author argues that it is an improper exercise of union discretion to refuse
to prosecute a discharge grievance because of lack of funds).
104. Although it still may be argued that union strength would be better promoted by
spontaneous rank-and-file support, rather than by judicial insulation from liability, the ar-
gument is unpersuasive in light of the practical pressures a union faces. See note 99 supra.
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Distinctions Based Upon Context and Conduct
Although the courts have purported to use the same "arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or bad faith" standard in each type of fair
representation case that has arisen, analysis reveals that they actu-
ally subject different situations to different levels of scrutiny. Most
particularly, in the discharge context, when procedural errors in
conduct are alleged, the courts have held the union to a greater
standard of care. While this same pattern is somewhat discernible
from the NLRB's treatment of the cases,0 5 the Board generally
105. In an effort to "clarify the scope of the obligation" before the Board, then Gen-
eral Counsel John S. Irving, whose remarks are particularly significant because the Board
cannot act on a case until the General Counsel has issued a complaint, circulated a memo-
randum dividing fair representation cases into four categories. Irving, supra note 5, at D-1.
The four categories are: (1) Instances of intentional misconduct attributable to improper
motives or fraud. See id at D-2; (2) Circumstances where the union's conduct is wholly
arbitrary, that is, where there is no rational basis upon which the union's conduct can be
explained. Id; (3) Certain instances of such gross negligence as to constitute reckless disre-
gard of the interests of the employee. Id. at D-2 to -3; (4) Instances where the union, after
deciding to grieve on behalf of the employee, undercuts the employee's grievance without
some reasonable or judgmental explanation. Id. at D-3 (citing cases). Most of the cases in
this category would fall within the presentation and preparation categories. See notes 126-35
& accompanying text infra.
The guidance afforded by the former General Counsel's memorandum is particularly
ambiguous in the third delineated category. Here, despite stating that he would not "add
further confusion by adding new word-tests," Irving, supra note 5, at D-1, General Counsel
Irving proposed that a line be drawn between instances of simple negligence and gross negli-
gence. However, he failed to provide any guidance as to how to draw this "admittedly diffi-
cult" line. In fact, he suggested that Regional Directors submit such difficult cases to the
General Counsel for advice. Id. at D-3. In contrast, the notion in tort law of distinguishing
between degrees of negligence generally has been rejected -as vague and impracticable. See
W. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 34, at 182 (4th ed. 1971).
The former General Counsel does cite the Sixth and Ninth Circuits for their discussions
of gross negligence in Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975), and
Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978), although noting he
is not bound by these decisions. These decisions, however, do not really clarify the distinc-
tion between gross and simple negligence. For example, the Robesky court miscites Ruzicka
in that the latter decision made no reference to "gross negligence." 573 F.2d at 1090.
Court decisions suggest that the negligent handling of a grievance may, at least in some
circumstances, constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. See notes 82, 136-48 &
accompanying text supra. Therefore a negligence or liberal standard should not be rejected
as being extreme. The NLRB's special expertise in this area is doubtful; the Board should
pay closer attention to court decisions. See Peck, The Administrative Procedure Act and
the NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum on Fair Representation Cases: Invalid
Rulemaking?, 31 LAB. L.J. 76, 81-82 (1980). Furthermore, it is difficult to determine how
General Counsel Irving intended to develop a gross negligence standard. If the test is to
apply only to the "really egregious case," Irving Address, supra note 5, at D-5, then it is not
clear how the analysis will differ from the instances of arbitrary or improperly motivated
conduct as previously defined. In addition, merely suggesting a negligence or recklessness
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has applied a lesser standard of care, requiring some evidence of
bad faith, hostility, or willfulness in order to find a breach of the
duty of fair representation.106
Unfair representation suits arise in primarily three contexts:
contract negotiations, seniority disputes, and wrongful discharges.
This division proves useful in analyzing which standard is to be
standard where the parameters of such standards are undefined may result in an unwar-
ranted expansion of the duty that is inconsistent with the Board's generally narrow view.
This can only add to the confusion over the proper standard to be applied in cases alleging a
breach of the duty of fair representation.
If, however, the application of a negligence standard is strictly limited, then it may
constitute the kind of clarification of the doctrine that is needed and provide a mechanism
by which the Board can uniformly and justifiably respond to the complaints of unfairly
represented workers. At present, however, Irving's proposed negligence category does not fit
well with the Board's narrow approach towards fair representation cases, particularly with
the expressed views of Chairman Fanning and Member Truesdale. See note 106 infra.
The Board's general predilection.for requiring some evidence of bad faith or willfulness
has somewhat obscured the "wholly arbitrary" and "gross negligence" categories. See, e.g.,
United Steelworkers, Local No. 7748, 246 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (1979); United As'n of Journey-
men & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., Local 60, 242 N.L.R.B. No. 173
(1979); Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, Local No. 106, 240 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (1979); ITT Arctic
Servs., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (1978); Irving Address, supra note 5, at D-4. However,;
Board decisions may nonetheless be examined within the delineated contextual categories.
See notes 107-48 & accompanying text infra.
106. See, e.g., United Steelworkers, Local No. 7748, 246 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (1979); United
Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., Local 60, 242
N.L.R.B. No. 173 (1979); Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, Local No. 106, 240 N.L.R.B. No. 29
(1979); ITT Arctic Servs., Inc., 238 N:L.R.B. No. 14 (1978); Irving Address, supra note 5, at
D-4.
General Counsel Irving made it clear that the purpose of his July 9, 1979, memorandum
was to define the scope of the duty of fair representation more narrowly. He was concerned
that "[t]he absence of clear standards and the extremely broad approach taken by some
courts have operated to adversely affect national labor policy." Irving Address, supra note 5,
at D-1. A similar concern over the ambiguity and breadth of the doctrine had provoked the
following statements from two members of the NLRB, in which they also noted their sup-
port for a narrower standard. Board Member Truesdale recently stated that he was "becom-
ing increasingly concerned with what seems to me to be unwarranted extensions of the law
in this area .... [U]nless attention is paid, both the NLRB and the courts seem to me to
be in danger of being drawn into the quagmire, of a descent into the vortex, if you will, of
attempting to monitor the effectiveness, as contrasted to the fairness, of union rdpresenta-
tion." Address by John Truesdale, NLRB Member, Federal Bar Association 1979 Southwest
Regional Conference (Mar. 1, 1979) & Labor Law Seminar of Nova University (Mar. 3,
1979), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, Mar. 13, 1979, at F-1. Similarly, Chair-,
man Fanning has remarked that these standards permit too broad an intrusion into internal
union affairs and that the Board should limit the breadth of its review to its statutory man-
date-situations that restrain or coerce union members in the exercise of the rights pro-
vided to them by § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). General Truck Drivers, Local




The union is afforded wider latitude in negotiating the collec-
tive bargaining agreement than in its subsequent enforcement or
administration of the agreement.107 In the area of contract negotia-
tions, the policies of the NLRA to promote collective bargaining
and to achieve industrial peace and stability1 8 justify the greatest
subordination of individual interests to the achievement of the col-
lective interest. It is uniformly agreed that a negligence standard
would be inappropriate in this area because the collective interests
of the bargaining unit are most clearly superior to those of the
individual.109
Seniority disputes may arise in the context of contract negoti-
ation or administration. These cases are often particularly difficult
for the union because it is often caught between the competing in-
terests of employees within the bargaining unit. e10 Notwithstand-
ing the fact that the employee may have strong accrued interests,
the nature of the grievance in this situation contrasts with that in
the discharge situation because a union that mishandles a seniority
dispute may have a later chance to remedy the aggrieved em-
ployee's claim.""' In addition, because the employee generally is
still a member of the bargaining unit, lie or she would have at least
the indirect recourse of seeking a change in the union's locally
elected representatives.11 2 Although some commentators advocate
making the union answerable to a greater standard of care because
of its special fiduciary relationship,113 the courts have not sub-
jected union discretion in seniority disputes to the greater degree
107. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953); Williams v.
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 617 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980); Ryan v. New York Newspaper Print-
ing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979); Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99
L.R.R.M. 2663, 2667 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Baker v. Newspaper & Graphics Communications
Union, Local 6, 104 L.R.R.M. 2197 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Flynn & Higgins, supra note 85, at
1109-10.
108. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
109. Because of the agreement that a negligence standard would be inappropriate in
this area, the following discussion will focus on issues arising in the course of contract
administration.
110. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533
F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 957,
580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978); Augspurger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d 853
(8th Cir. 1975); Denver Stereotypers v. NLRB, 104 L.R.R.M. 2656 (10th Cir. 1980).
lil. See Dinges, supra note 5, at 1783.
112. Irving Address, supra note 5, at D-2.
113. See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 85, at 1143-52; Summers, supra note 54, at 276.
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of scrutiny applied in discharge cases.11
The underlying grievance in the vast majority of duty of fair
representation cases is for wrongful discharge. The severe impact
of a discharge on an employee is so significant that it is commonly
referred to as the "industrial equivalent of capital punishment. '115
Many courts and commentators have therefore distinguished the
discharge grievance as being inherently more serious than others. A
union's failure to undertake basic and necessary steps to represent
the employee effectively "locks the jailhouse door" for the dis-
chargee.111 Consequently, a greater degree of scrutiny of union con-
duct and an emphasis on individual rights is often exercised in
these situations. Although many of the commentators urging the
adoption of a negligence standard would have it applied far beyond
the narrow confines suggested in this Note, they correctly empha-
size the importance of the discharge grievance in formulating their
proposals.
1 1 7
Even in discharge cases, however, the courts generally have
not held the union to a greater standard of care where a question
of contract interpretation was involved,11 8 where a decision had
been made on the merits of the grievance, 119 or in cases challenging
the adequacy of representation at hearings.120 But a greater stan-
dard of care has been applied in wrongful discharge cases in which
114. See, e.g., Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590
F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. General Truck Drivers, Local 315, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir.
1976); Augspurger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1975).
115. See, e.g., Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972);
Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Dinges, supra note 5, at
1783-86; Flynn & Higgins, supra note 85, at 1146-47. The impact of a discharge arises in
part from the inevitable disruption of the worker's personal life, the unforeseen and imme-
diate loss of income, and the investment lost in seniority and pension rights.
116. Dinges, supra note 5, at 1783.
117. Professor Dinges, for instance, would "require that unions establish a compelling
union reason before they may refuse to take a discharge grievance to arbitration." Dinges,
supra note 5, at 1786. Professors Flynn and Higgins state that "[t]he remediless employee,
wrongfully discharged because of union negligence in the handling of his discharge griev-
ance, even when the grievance can be proved meritorious, presents courts with a clear exam-
ple of institutional failure ripe for correction." Flynn & Higgins, supra note 85, at 1146-47
(footnote omitted). See also Summers, supra note 54, at 278.
118. See, e.g., Ethier v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1979). See
note 125 & accompanying text infra.
119. See, e.g., Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970).
120. See, e.g., Franklin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979);
Bantley v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. 3232 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See also Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See notes 126-35 & accompanying text infra.
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the union allegedly failed to perform a basic procedural
requirement.121
The union action or inaction challenged in cases alleging
breach of the duty of fair representation in handling discharge
grievances can be separated into three general categories of con-
duct: substantive errors, 12 2 errors in the preparation or presenta-
tion of grievances,123 and procedural errors.124 Only in cases involv-
ing procedural errors have the unions been held to a negligence
standard of care.
Allegations that the union has committed substantive errors
in the evaluation of the grievant's case arise relatively infrequently,
and recovery is rare absent evidence of improper motivation; the
courts are reluctant to second guess the union on questions of con-
tract interpretation. A union's conduct will be subject to examina-
tion only upon a showing that the -union's position is not supported
by any rational interpretation of the contract or that it was moti-
vated by discrimination or bad faith.1 2 5 The standard of care is
narrowly applied because holding the union to a greater standard
would encourage direct judicial interference with union
decisionmaking.
The second category of cases involves alleged error in the
preparation or presentation of the grievance at a hearing. In these
cases, negligence or poor judgment generally will not suffice to es-
tablish a breach of the duty of fair representation. 20 It is recog-
121. See Willetts v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1978) (failure to keep
employee informed); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975) (failure
to file in a timely fashion); Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir.
1972) (filing with wrong person); De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425
F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970) (failure to investigate); Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M. 2663
(W.D. Mich. 1978) (gross negligence in investigating). But see Coe v. United Rubber Work-
ers, 571 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1978) (negligence in misnumbering a claim gave employer de-
fense of untimeliness; no breach). See notes 136-48 & accompanying text infra.
122. See note 125 & accompanying text infra.
123. See notes 126-35 & accompanying text infra.
124. See notes 136-48 & accompanying text infra.
125. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ethier v. United States Postal Serv.,
590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1979); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977);
Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970); Savel v. Detroit News, 435 F.
Supp. 329 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Perry v. Chrysler Corp., 101 L.R.R.M. 2681 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
This Note does not cover these cases further because a negligence standard would be inap-
propriate, and such a standard has not been suggested by the courts. See notes 99-104 &
accompanying text supra.
126. See, e.g., Franklin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979);
Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975); Bruno v. United
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nized that arbitration hearings are not judicial proceedings and
need not be conducted as such; the union is not required to handle
the matter with the expertise of a trial lawyer. 127 Because neither
lawyers nor strict adherence to rules of evidence are required in
these hearings, errors in tactics and procedure are usually ex-
cused .128 Nevertheless, both the courts and the Board recognize
that once a union decides to pursue a grievance to arbitration, it
has an affirmative obligation to advocate the employee's position
"fully and fairly and to function as her advocate. '129 This obliga-
tion forms a firmer basis for liability in this area. However, the
Board tends to emphasize any evidence of hostility or other im-
proper motives in finding that the union's conduct in preparing or
presenting a grievance has been "arbitrary" or "perfunctory. 1 i s
In general, the courts also are reluctant to suggest in hindsight
what the union representative "should have argued" or "should
have emphasized."' ' Although some decisions have required a
Steelworkers, Local 3571, 456 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1978); Mangiaguerra v. D & L Transp.,
Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Bantley v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. 3232
(N.D. Cal. 1977). Cf. Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1978) (negligent
conduct may breach the duty if it has the effect of depriving the grievant of a fair hearing).
127. Teamsters, Local Union 327, 233 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1217 (1977); Truck Drivers, Lo-
cal Union No. 355, 229 N.L.R.B. 1319, 1320-21 (1977).
128. See Walden v. Local 71, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 468 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972).
See also Franklin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979); Bantley v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. 3232 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
129. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local No. 579, 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 695 (1977). See
Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. PPG Indus.
Inc., 579 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1978); Kesner v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 983 (1976); PPG Indus. Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 713 (1977), enforcement denied, 579
F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1978); Groves-Granite, 229 N.L.R.B. 56 (1977).
130. See Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, Local No. 106, 240 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (1979);
Brown Transp. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 711 (1978); United Steelworkers, 223 N.L.R.B. 1184
(1976). But see Whitehead, 224 N.L.R.B. 244 (1976).
131. But see Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd on other
grounds, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975). The district court in
Holodnak overturned the decision of the arbitrator and alternately termed the union attor-
ney's preparation for and handling of the grievance hearing "perfunctory" and "arbitrary."
The employee had been discharged for printing an article critical of company and union
practices. Although the court went to great lengths in reviewing the union's presentation at
the hearing, indicating what it reasoned the union attorney "should have argued" and
"should have emphasized," id. at 200, the decision is distinguishable by the influence of the
first amendment issue and the inquisitorial intrusion into the grievant's political beliefs at
the arbitration hearing. The outrageous behavior of the parties was unusual, and it seems
unlikely other courts will be similarly inclined to second guess the union's presentation in
most cases.
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finding of bad faith, ill will, or spite,3 2 most decisions apply Vaca's
amorphous catchwords "arbitrary" or "perfunctory" in finding that
the union's negligence or laxity has not risen to the level required
for a breach.133
In presentation cases, for example, where the plaintiff alleges
that the union failed to object to the introduction of certain evi-
dence at the hearing, the courts generally have employed a defer-
ential approach. Courts have demonstrated a similar reluctance to
find the union liable in cases where the union failed to present per-
tinent evidence or arguments.' At least one court, however, has
shown a greater willingness to find a breach where the union is
"ignorant of those contract provisions having a direct bearing on
the case." 35
The third category, procedural errors, constitutes the most fre-
quently alleged breach. Typically these involve failure to investi-
gate adequately the merit of the grievance, failure to inform the
employee of pertinent matters with respect to the handling or pro-
gress of his or her grievance, or failure to file the grievance in a
timely manner. Although the scrutiny employed may vary greatly
among each of these subcategories, all fall within the vague con-
tours of Vaca.
The union's obligation to make some investigation of the mer-
its of an individual's grievance arises from Vaca v. Sipes.13 6 Simple
132. See Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975) (no
breach when union failed to raise defense that sobriety rule was improperly promulgated);
Bruno v. United Steelworkers, Local 3571, 456 F. Supp. 425 (D. Conn. 1978) (no breach
when union neglected to present evidence of more lenient treatment of other employees who
had breached company's rules more severely). See also Mangiaguerra v. D & L Transp., Inc.,
410 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
133. See, e.g., Buchanan v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1979) (no breach in union's
failure to invoke reinstatement provision of collective bargaining agreement pending arbi-
tration); Franklin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1979) (no breach in
union's failure to present certain medical evidence to Arbitration Board). See also Connally
v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1978) (no breach in union's failure to apprise
Multi-State Committee of procedural rules where union's presentation was not so poor as to
deprive grievant of a fair hearing). Some courts, however, have found a violation in situa-
tions similar to that in Connally. See, e.g., Marietta v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 414 F. Supp.
1029 (D. N.J. 1976); Arnold v. A & P Tea Co., 102 L.R.R.M. 2409 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
134. See, e.g., Mangiaguerra v. D & L Transp., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1976);
Bantley v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. 3232 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
135. Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 957, 580 F.2d 232,
235 (6th Cir. 1978). But see Buchanan v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1979).
136. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). "In administering the grievance and arbitration machinery
as statutory agent of the employees, a union must, in good faith and in a nonarbitrary man-
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negligence in investigating a grievance has not been held to breach
the duty of fair representation, 37 but at least one court has sug-
gested the applicability of a gross negligence standard.138 The
Ninth Circuit has held that the thoroughness of an investigation is
immaterial.3 ' This seems to be a better position because it would
obviate unwelcome judicial determinations of what constitutes a
reasonable investigation.
The NLRB General Counsel, in a recent memorandum, stated
that the Board will not judge the adequacy of a union's efforts un-
less no inquiry has been made or the inquiry conducted is so per-
functory that it is tantamount to no inquiry at all. 1 0 The union is
required to make only "some inquiry into the facts" or have "some
basis in reason" for its contract interpretation.1 4 1 In practice, how-
ever, it is evident that in investigation cases, as in most other con-
texts, the Board will often look to find some evidence of bad faith
or hostility to establish a breach."1
2
In cases where the alleged breach is based in whole or in part
on the union's failure to inform the employee of some crucial mat-
ter, such as the time of a hearing or the union's decision not to
pursue the grievance, most courts look to see whether the em-
ployee's position has been prejudiced by the union's silence.143
ner, make decisions as to the merits of particular grievances." Id. at 194. See, e.g., Smith v.
Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980); Baldini v. Local Union No. 1095,
Int'l Union, UAW, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978); Hughes v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 683, 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977); Minnis v. International Union, UAW, 531 F.2d 850
(8th Cir. 1975); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st
Cir. 1970); Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M. 2663 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
137. See Minnis v. International Union, UAW, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975); Hersh-
man v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 434 F. Supp. 46 (D. Nev. 1977); Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99
L.R.R.M. 2663, 2665 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
138. See Barhitte v. Kroger Co., 99 L.R.R.M. 2663, 2670 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
139. See Hughes v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 683, 554 F.2d 365, 367 n.1
(9th Cir. 1977); Hershman v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 434 F. Supp. 46, 49-51 (D. Nev. 1977).
140. Irving Address, supra note 5. See notes 136-37 & accompanying text supra.
141. Irvin Address, supra note 5, at D-2. See, e.g., Washington-Baltimore Newspaper
Guild, Local 35, 239 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1979); ITT Arctic Serva., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 14
(1978); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1470 (1978); Service
Employees Int'l Union, Local No. 579, 229 N.L.R.B. 692 (1977); American Postal Workers
Union, Local 4193, 226 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1976); Whitehead, 224 N.L.R.B. 244 (1976).
142. See Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, Local No. 106, 240 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (1979); ITT
Arctic Servs., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (1978).
143. Decisions finding a breach where the employee's position was prejudiced by the
union's nondisclosure include Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th
Cir. 1978), and Pratt v. United Air Lines, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Cal. 1978). For deci-
sions where no prejudice was found, see Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d
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Where the employee's interests have been adequately represented,
courts have held that the failure to notify does not constitute a
breach of the duty.1 44 The prejudice test provides a better standard
for evaluating errors in this procedural context than would a negli-
gence standard alone. If the grievant's position has not been irrev-
ocably harmed by the union's failure, either because he or she was
nonetheless adequately represented at the hearing or because the
grievance can still be filed, the union should not be held liable for
its failure to keep the employee informed. 45 However, the
prejudice test may not always provide the best means for judging
union conduct. For instance, in a discharge case the union should
be responsible for informing the employee of a settlement offer
made by the employer before it is rejected.146
The final category of procedural errors in conduct involves
cases arising from the union's failure to file before the deadline or
otherwise to take the necessary basic steps in the contractual
Cir. 1970); Siskey v. General Teamsters, Local No. 261, 419 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Pa. 1976);
Kleban v. Hygrade Food Prod. Corp., 102 L.R.R.M. 2773 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
144. See Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980); Schum v.
South Buffalo Ry. Co., 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974). The union in Schum processed a dis-
charged employee's grievance through the first stage of the grievance process but failed to
file an appeal within the required time. The court found that if the grievant reasonably
relied on the union's processing of the grievance until the filing time had passed, the union
had breached its duty. The court, however, also referred to the union's duty of due care and
diligence in procedural processing matters. See also Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.
Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
145. The Board has noted that a union may not "purposely" keep an employee unin-
formed or misinformed. Local 417, Intl Union, UAW, 245 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1979); Groves-
Granite, 229 N.L.R.B. 56 (1977). For the duty to inform during contract negotiations, see
Warehouse Union, Local 860, 236 N.L.R.B. 844, 850-51 (1978). This element of willfulness
has not been required in the federal courts. See notes 143-44 & accompanying text supra;
notes 146-50 & accompanying text infra.
146. In Perry v. Chrysler Corp., 101 L.R.R.M. 2681 (E.D. Mich. 1978), the local union
rejected management's settlement offer to reinstate a discharged employee contingent upon
the employee's participation in an alcohol abuse rehabilitation program. The court rejected
the allegation that the union's failure to report the offer to the grievant was a breach of its
duty of fair representation. The court noted that the union must have the discretion to
refuse to "settle cheap" to avoid a harmful precedent for future grievances. Id. at 2685 n.4.
See note 79 supra. Although this argument may be persuasive in some grievance situations,
in discharge cases the consequences to the employee are sufficiently grave to require that he
or she be informed of any settlement offer made before it is rejected. In this context it is not
appropriate to subordinate the interests of a dischargee, who may be without recourse, in
order to promote the position of the union as the collective bargaining agent. See note 86 &
accompanying text supra. See also Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082
(9th Cir. 1978).
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grievance procedure.147 Such errors, occurring in the routine steps
of grievance processing, may not warrant an investigation of union
intent.14 8 Consequently, simple negligence may appropriately be
applied to these mechanical functions to find a breach of the duty
of fair representation. However, only where an error is "inexplica-
ble," where the union fails to consider the merit of the grievance,
or where the failure to file is not based in whole or in part on any
legitimate considerations would the application of such a standard
be-warranted.
Conclusion
An analysis of the cases involving the doctrine of fair repre-
sentation reveals that a disparity exists between the Board's gener-
ally narrow interpretation of what constitutes a breach of the' duty
of fair representation and the manner in which the doctrine has
been expanded in many courts. 149 This split between the Board
and the courts is detrimental to the formation of a uniform labor
policy.1 50 Furthermore, it promotes forum shopping by prospective
plaintiffs and leads labor practitioners and their counsel to be un-
sure of the standard to which they could be held in fair representa-
tion cases. The analytical framework employed in this Note dem-
onstrates that different levels of scrutiny are employed when
applying the Vaca standard to each of several categories of fair
representation cases. The nature of the union conduct called into
question and the importance of the plaintiff's underlying grievance
147. In this area as well, the Board has continued to apply a narrower standard. Al-
though negligence or ineptitude is not a breach, see, e.g., PPG Indus. Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No.
166 (1979); General Truck Drivers Union Local No. 692, 209 N.L.R.B. 446 (1974), a willful
failure to process the grievance is a breach of the duty of fair representation. See Local 417
Int'l Union, UAW, 245 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1979). In a concurring opinion, Chairman Fanning
agreed only with the finding that the union's conduct was improperly motivated by animos-
ity. He did not reach the issue of willfulness. Id. at 2 n.2 (Fanning, Ch., concurring).
148. See Ethier v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1979). Contra
Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See also Griffin v. Inter-
national Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972). See notes 62-63, 79 & accompanying
text supra. The union in Griffin filed the grievance with a person who was authorized to
receive it, but one with whom the employee, who was discharged for fighting, had fought.
The union's conduct was held to be arbitrary, even though it had decided to pursue the
grievance, when there were others with whom the grievance could have been filed.
149. The sympathies of the jury in the lower courts have undoubtedly had significant
impact in the pattern that has emerged. In fact, a review of the cases discloses that the
overwhelming majority of recoveries are in decisions that uphold jury verdicts.
150. See Irving Address, supra note 5, at D-1 to -2.
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significantly influence the application of the standard. Unfortu-
nately, the distinctions between the categories are not always clear,
and this adds uncertainty to the outcome of fair representation
suits. However, when the employee has been wrongfully discharged
and the alleged breach is of a certain procedural character, the
courts are consistently sympathetic to the plaintiff and hold the
union to a greater standard of care.
In Foust, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify
the parameters of the duty in a manner which would provide prac-
tical guidance to practitioners, but declined to make this clarifica-
tion. Instead, Foust has added to the existing uncertainty over the
standard by impliedly suggesting the adoption of a negligence
standard. The analysis undertaken in this Note demonstrates that
a standard of reasonable care can only be consistent with national
labor policy, Vaca, and judicial developments, if it is strictly lim-
ited to high impact grievance situations, such as a discharge, where
the union's negligence on essential procedural steps has precluded
consideration of the employee's grievance. It does not overstep le-
gitimate expectations to require reasonable compliance with these
fundamental elements of modern union representation.
Judicial review of a union's representation of individuals in a
bargaining unit should not include second-guessing the union's le-
gitimate contemplation of a grievance's priority or its judgment on
substantive matters. The union was formed by workers and re-
mains the best mechanism to assert and protect both their collec-
tive and individual interests. Only where the individual's interests
are at their strongest and the error in representation is procedural
rather than judgmental should the judiciary's interference be
encouraged.
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